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ARGUMENT 
L INTRODUCTION 
In the Appellants' opening Brief the Conatsers put forth a simple argument, which 
takes the basic form of a syllogism: 
Major premise: 
The owner of a property right also holds whatever incidental 
rights are reasonable and necessary to fully enjoy the 
underlying property right. See Brief of Appellants at 18-19 
(citing cases). 
Minor premise: 
Utah law recognizes a property right, held by the public, to 
use natural waters overlying privately owned lands to "float 
leisure craft, hunt, fish, and participate in any lawful 
activity...." Id. at 17-18 (citing JJ.KP. Co. v. State Div. of 
Wildlife Resources, 655 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1982)). 
Conclusion: 
Therefore, the public should have the right to make contact 
with privately owned subaqueous land, where such contact is 
reasonably incident to a public right, such as fishing. Id. at 6, 
22.1 
Appellees' Brief in Opposition ("Opp. Brief) offers a number of discrete arguments in 
response. It seems most helpful to simply reply to each argument in turn, following the 
basic format adopted in the Opp. Brief. 
The Conatsers also made certain subsidiary arguments, which together support the 
premises relied on in reaching the conclusion. For instance, the Conatsers argued that the 
Weber River is a natural water, to which any public rights under the minor premise would 
attach, and that wading is a reasonable and customary method of fishing. Appellees have 
not contested any of these subsidiary arguments. 
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Before reaching the Argument section, Appellees' Opp. Brief introduces two 
assertions that it returns to from time to time throughout the brief. First, in describing 
JJ.N.P. Co. v. State Div. of Wildlife Resources, 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982), 
Appellees assert that this Court held that "because the public owns the water in natural 
streams, there is a corresponding right to float upon such waters." Opp. Brief at 2 
(emphasis added). The error in this assertion is clear, in that it misstates the holding of 
JJ.N.P.; that case did not hold that public ownership of water resulted in a public right of 
floatation only, but resulted in a broad recreational right, including the right to "hunt, 
fish, and participate in any lawful activities." 655 P.2d at 1137. This erroneous 
narrowing of J.J.N.P. is a means for Appellees to avoid the conclusion stated above (and 
argue for an affirmation of the district court's ruling) without challenging the major 
premise, that property rights include reasonable and necessary incidental rights. In other 
words, because Appellees more or less concede that the Conatsers are entitled to rights 
incidental to whatever rights were declared in JJ.N.P., they are essentially forced to 
argue for an unduly narrow interpretation of that right. 
Second, Appellees assert that since the Weber River is not federally navigable, and 
that their land is therefore privately owned (conclusions that Appellants have not 
contested in this litigation), that therefore "the owners thereof retain the important right to 
prohibit others from making use of it in the manner urged by the Conatsers." Opp. Brief 
at 4. This argument begs the very question presented in this appeal. No one disputes that 
Appellees, like all private landowners, generally enjoy the right to exclude others from 
their property. It is also undisputed, however, that Appellees' right to exclude is subject 
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to the public's right to use the Weber River to "float leisure craft, hunt, fish, and 
participate in any lawful activities." 655 P.2d at 1137. Thus, Appellees do not have the 
right to exclude the Conatsers from the Weber River, even as it crosses their private 
property, so long as the Conatsers are floating, hunting, fishing, or pursuing other lawful 
activities. The issue framed by footnote six of J J.N. P., and presented in this case, is the 
scope of that right, and specifically whether it includes the right to set foot on the bed of 
the river, or is merely a limited right to invade private airspace, so long as separated from 
the private dirt by the buoyancy of the public water. To simply assert that because the 
land is private, Appellees have the right to exclude the Conatsers, ignores the central 
issue and jumps directly to an unsupported conclusion. 
n. THE CONATSERS REPLY TO APPELLEES1 SPECIFIC ARGUMENTS 
In the following sections, the Conatsers respond to Appellees5 arguments point-
by-point. 
A, Private ownership of the bed ol the Weber River does NOT give 
Appellees an unlimited right to exclude others. 
Appellee's repeat their blanket assertion that "because the bed in question is in 
private ownership, the owners thereof have the constitutionally protected right to prohibit 
others from making use of it." Opp. Brief at 5. Again, this argument begs the question 
and ignores that the Appellees' property is subject to what this Court described as a 
public easement, from which Appellees have no right to exclude any member of the 
public who is properly using that easement. At issue in this case is the scope of that 
easement - or, to put it in the terms used by Appellees - the scope of the limit on 
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Appellees' right to exclude. Appellees' insistence that ownership of the bed carries with 
it an unlimited right to exclude ignores J J.N.P., avoids true argument, and offers only a 
conclusory assertion. 
1. The District Court's Ruling is NOT supported by prior Utah 
Supreme Court decisions. 
Appellees argue that two prior decisions from this Court dictate a ruling in their 
favor. Opp. Brief at 6-8. Specifically, Appellees seize on two words used by the Court 
in JJ.N.P. to describe the public's easement: "over" and "upon." Opp. Brief, at 6. 
Appellees seem to contend that by describing the public easement as one "over the water" 
and noting that "the public does not trespass when upon such waters," the Court was 
limiting the public easement to only those uses that could be exercised while floating 
over or upon the surface of public waters. This argument is completely undermined by 
footnote six, which expressly declines to rule on that issue. 655 P.2d at 1138, n. 6. 
Given the Court's decision to remain silent on that issue, its choice of words is not 
surprising - it would seem that the JJ.N.P. court was careful with its words simply to 
avoid any argument that it was leaning one way or the other with respect to the question 
reserved by footnote six. Contrary to Appellees' suggestion, the Court today should not 
read a holding into a few arguably suggestive words contained in the JJ.N.P. decision, 
where the JJ.N.P. Court itself expressly disclaimed making a ruling on that issue. 
Appellees' reliance on Monroe v. State, 175 P.2d 759 (Utah 1946) is equally 
unavailing. That case involved a straightforward question of federal navigability, where 
the only issue was title to the bed of Scipio Lake. Id. at 760. The question presented here 
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- public rights to step on the bed as an incident to recreational use of the public water -
was simply not at issue. 
In short, Appellees' contention that precedent from this Court supports the trial 
court's ruling is without foundation. Monroe is wholly inapposite, and J J.N.P. expressly 
declined to rule on the issue. 
2. Day v. Armstrong commits a crucial error in reasoning, which this 
Court should not perpetuate. 
Appellees rely heavily on Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961) since it 
articulates the position taken by the district court in this matter. In doing so, however, 
Appellees have glossed over an error in the Day court's reasoning. Specifically, 
Appellees describe Day as holding that "'irrespective' of navigability, the public was 
entitled to make use of the water for floating provided the water was actually capable of 
supporting such use." Opp. Brief at 10. That is an incomplete description of the Day 
holding. Toward the beginning of the decision, the Wyoming Supreme Court actually 
held, much like the Utah Supreme Court in J J.N.P., that "the actual usability of the 
waters is alone the limit of the public's right to so employ them." 362 P.2d at 143. The 
Day court later reiterated that broad public right, stating that since the waters were owned 
by the public, "they are available for such uses by the public of which they are capable." 
Id. at 145. 
In the very next sentence, however, the Day court inexplicably narrowed its focus 
to floating, and proceeded to limit the public right to use the underlying bed to those uses 
incidental to floatation. Id. at 145-46. The Day court never explains why the public 
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should not have rights to use the riverbed that are incidental to other uses of which the 
waters are capable, and one is left with the impression that the court simply could not 
shake the legacy of "navigability," despite its recognition that navigation is irrelevant 
when the water is owned by the public. 
This Court should not repeat the error of Day - public water may be used for a 
wide variety of purposes, not just floating or navigation. Accordingly, in order for the 
public to fully enjoy its ownership of the water, its incidental rights should not be 
determined by the right of floating alone. 
Appellees also comment on the state's "power to regulate the use of water," and 
argue that to "grant" the public the right to step on private riverbeds would constitute a 
taking. Opp. Brief at 10-11. This argument mistakes the role of this Court, which is not 
to regulate or grant anything, but merely to find the law. See Provo River Water Users' 
2
 Of course, regulation of public waters is the province of the legislative branch. See 
J J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136 ("The State regulates the use of the water, in effect, as trustee 
for the benefit of the people."). That is not to say, of course, that the decision in this case 
will have no bearing on the issue. If the Court decides in favor of the Conatsers, and 
rules that public ownership of waters carries with it the right to make reasonable 
incidental use of private riverbeds, it would seem that the State Legislature could impose 
reasonable restrictions on that use. If, however, the Court finds that the public has no 
such incidental right, the Legislature's options would seem to be more limited: 
Ironically the majority opinion, while implying that the General Assembly 
is competent to change the rule adopted today, has complicated the 
prospects of having the rule changed in the future. The Court has painted 
the state into a comer, and its brushwork assures that any effort to alter the 
rule will be difficult and expensive. The Court, by creating a vested 
property right in stream water (with the concomitant right to exclude all 
others from that water), has created a valuable property interest. And the 
General Assembly, therefore, cannot give the public recreational access to 
rivers without taking away from landowners their newly recognized 
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Assoc, v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 932-33, n. 8 (Utah 1993) (tracing evolution of the legal 
status of percolating water from private to public, but holding that "public ownership of 
all water in the state must have always been so.") (emphasis in original). In other words, 
the Court's decision in this matter will not take a property interest from anyone, but will 
merely declare what their property interests have always been. 
3. The Question of Navigability is Irrelevant in this Case. 
Appellees insist that the question of navigability is "inescapable," and from the 
context it is clear that Appellees are referring to federal navigability for title purposes. 
See Opp. Brief at 12-13. Appellees' insistence in this regard is somewhat puzzling: the 
only relevance of the federal test of navigability is to determine ownership to the 
submerged land, but the Conatsers have not contested the private status of the submerged 
land in question here. 
At any rate, Appellees' discussion of navigability presents a fallacious argument. 
Specifically, Appellees first note that if the Weber River were federally navigable, then 
the State would own the bed, and the Appellees would not have the right to exclude the 
public therefrom. See Opp. Brief at 12. Then, Appellees assert that since the Weber 
River is not federally navigable, Appellees must have the right to exclude the public from 
the bed. See Opp. Brief at 12-13. Obviously, this conclusion does not follow; the lack of 
federal navigability renders the bed of the Weber River private property, but privately 
owned property does not always carry with it an unlimited right to exclude. Private 
property interests and paying them "just compensation." 
People v. Ernmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1033 (Carrigan, J., dissenting) 
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property is often burdened by servitudes or estates that allow non-owners to make some 
use of the property. Once again, by trying to draw a strict equation between private 
property and an unlimited right to exclude, Appellees have begged the question and 
ignored the real issue. 
B. State wildlife statutes do NOT speak to the issue presented here. 
Appellees argue that Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-14 supports their position that the 
public holds no right to touch or walk upon a privately-owned riverbed. That statute 
provides that no person may enter privately owned land for the purposes of taking 
wildlife, where the land is "properly posted." Id. at § 23-20-14(2)(a). The statute further 
provides that "properly posted" 
means that "No Trespassing" signs or a minimum of 100 
square inches of bright yellow, bright orange, or fluorescent 
paint are displayed at all corners, fishing streams crossing 
property lines, roads, gates, and rights-of-way entering the 
land. 
Id. at § 23-20-14(l)(d). Appellees' interpretation of this statute - that it allows private 
landowners to restrict public use of a fishing stream, merely by posting it as private - is 
incorrect. Rather, the inclusion of "fishing streams" in a list that includes "roads, gates, 
and rights-of-way entering the land" suggests a legislative recognition that the public may 
enter and pass through private land on public servitudes, including fishing streams, but 
that the landowner should be able to put the public on notice that the underlying fee is 
privately owned, and that taking of wildlife outside the scope of the right-of-way (in the 
case of a fishing stream, above the ordinary high water mark) is not allowed. To hold 
otherwise would allow private landowners to lock up rivers as private fisheries, 
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appropriating to themselves fish that are in fact public property. See Utah Code Ann. § 
23-13-3 (declaring all wildlife in the state to be "the property of the state"). Had the Utah 
Legislature intended this result, surely it would have made that intent clear. 
C. The "Wyoming Rule" is flawed, and should NOT be adopted simply 
because it falls somewhere in the middle of a continuum between the 
approaches adopted by other western states. 
Appellees next argue that this Court should adopt the Wyoming rule, as articulated 
in Day v. Armstrong, because it is a "middle of the road" approach lying between the 
"extreme" positions taken by Montana and Colorado. Opp. Brief at 15. 
The Conatsers first note that this argument would be more appropriately addressed 
to a legislative body, in that it is essentially an argument based on what Appellees believe 
to be the appropriate public policy with regard to public rights in waters and their 
underlying beds. 
Secondly, Appellees' argument is not compelling, even as a public policy 
argument. Even if the Montana and Colorado positions represent two ends of a spectrum 
of potential approaches, it does not necessarily follow that the preferred approach is one 
lying somewhere in between. This is rather like saying that since some countries 
guarantee universal suffrage, and others do not provide for democratic elections at all, the 
"best" approach would be to allow only half the populace to vote. In short, it makes little 
sense to argue that a given policy choice is best simply because it falls somewhere in 
between opposite approaches. 
Moreover, Appellees' contention that Montana and Colorado lie at the extreme 
ends of the spectrum, with Wyoming in the middle, is not accurate. The J.J.N.P. court, 
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after all, identified a Wyoming case (Day) and an Idaho case (Southern Idaho Fish and 
Game Associate v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295 (Idaho 1974)) as offering 
examples of the "differing rules" on this issue. 655 P.2d at 1138, n. 6. The J J.N.P. court 
did not even mention Colorado, perhaps because unlike Utah and Wyoming (and 
arguably Idaho, see Brief of Appellants at 25, n. 9), Colorado has rejected the doctrine of 
public ownership of water. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979). Ironically, if 
one excludes Colorado from the comparison, since it is not a public ownership state, 
Wyoming becomes the extreme position, and - under Appellees' reasoning - should be 
rejected on that basis alone. 
All of that said, the Conatsers agree that the Colorado approach is a poor one, in 
part because it clings to a strict application of the common law principle that "he who 
owns the surface of the ground has the exclusive right to everything which is above it." 
Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1027. That principle has been recognized as outmoded by the 
United States Supreme Court. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) ("that 
doctrine has no place in the modern world"). More importantly, this Court has already 
rejected the Colorado approach, and held that the public owns and may use all natural 
waters in the state, even where those waters lie above the surface of privately owned 
ground. See J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136-37. 
Appellees criticize the Montana line of decisions because, in their view, they have 
led to "considerable uncertainty." Opp. Brief at 19. The Conatsers disagree. The first 
two Montana cases established, in clear terms, that public rights in waters derive from 
public ownership of the waters, and that public rights extend to "the bed and banks up to 
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the ordinary high water mark." See Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 
P.2d 163, 170 (Mont. 1984); Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 
1088, 1091 (Mont. 1984). 
Whatever uncertainty that has existed in Montana law came not from those cases, 
but from the Montana Legislature. Following Curran and Hildreth, the Montana 
Legislature enacted a stream access law, which recognized the holding of those cases and 
sought to specify precisely what rights the public should enjoy in public waters and 
privately owned beds underneath. Certain of those rights, however, were deemed by the 
Montana Supreme Court as too burdensome on the servient estate, and declared to be 
unconstitutional takings of private rights. Gait v. State Dept. of Fish and Wildlife, 731 
P.2d 912 (Mont. 1987) (finding unconstitutional provisions of the stream access law 
which allowed the public to build duck blinds, boat moorings, and to camp overnight on 
the beds and banks of all state waters). The Gait decision, however, did not result in any 
uncertainty - quite the contrary, it reiterated its earlier holdings that "the public has the 
right to use the water for recreational purposes and minimal use of underlying and 
adjoining real estate essential to enjoyment of its ownership in water." Id. at 915. 
In short, since at least the issuance of the Hildreth decision in 1984, both Montana 
decisional and statutory law have consistently upheld the public's right to step on 
privately owned riverbeds as an incident to the use of public waters. Accordingly, 
Appellees' critique of the Montana decisions - that they have led to uncertainty - is 
unfounded. 
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D, Setting a foot on private riverbeds is a reasonable and necessary 
incidental use of public waters for fishing, and a holding to that effect 
will NOT convert streams into thoroughfares. 
Lastly, Appellees argue that walking on the bed of a public river is "clearly" more 
than incidental to the use of the river itself, and further that such a rule would be 
"unmanageable." Opp. Brief at 26. 
Specifically, Appellees urge that an easement cannot be "enlarged" to place a 
greater burden on the servient estate. This is a correct statement of an inapplicable rule. 
The question of enlargement arises where the easement in question is reasonably well 
defined, such as by grant or prescription, and the easement holder seeks to impose some 
new or different use on the servient estate. See, e.g., Nielson v. Sandberg, 141 P.2d 696, 
700 (Utah 1943) (holding that ditch easement created for the benefit of one party for 
power purposes could not be used by another party for different purposes, because an 
easement "is limited to uses for which, or by which, it was acquired, and to the person 
who acquired it, or for the benefit of the property for which it was acquired."). 
Here, however, it is the physical or spatial scope of the easement which is 
uncertain, and which is expressly undefined. J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d. at 1138, n. 6. One could 
only call the Conatser's position an "enlargement" if it is assumed that the public 
easement currently does not include the right to walk on the bed. Again, this is an 
example of Appellees begging the question, advancing an argument that only makes 
sense if one presumes from the outset that their position is correct. 
Appellees also argue that it is inappropriate for this Court to consider the burdens 
to which their servient estate is already subject. Opp. Brief at 27-28. Appellees cite no 
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authority for this proposition, and it defies common sense - how can a reviewing court 
assess the burden created by some disputed use without an understanding of the nature of 
the servient property? See Restatement (Third) of Prop: Servitudes § 4.10, cmt. g (noting 
that in determining whether burdens imposed on the servient estate are reasonable, the 
character of the servient property is an important concern). 
In this appeal, Appellees do not challenge the Conatsers' right to float through 
their property to fish, but they insist that if the Conatsers are allowed to wade through 
their property to fish, they are subject to some unreasonable additional burden. The only 
difference between the two uses is contact with the rocks and mud under the Weber 
River. Thus, it seems entirely appropriate - if not necessary - to assess what rights the 
Appellees have in those rocks and that mud. As noted in the Conatsers' opening brief, 
though Appellees own the rocks and mud in fee, their use of that property is severely 
limited not only by the existence of the overlying water itself, but by the public nature of 
the water, and by state and federal laws that recognize the public interest in the 
submerged land. Brief of Appellants at 23. In short, those regulatory restrictions are an 
important part of the context in which this Court analyzes the burden on Appellees' 
property from the Conatsers' disputed use, and ultimately arrives at an appropriate 
balancing of interests. 
3
 In fact, since even under Appellees' view, an angler in a raft would be entitled to step 
on the bed in order to maneuver his or her raft over sandbars, around rapids, etc., the only 
difference between floaters and waders is the reason that the angler's boot touches the 
riverbed. Appellees cannot seriously contend that this subjective distinction imposes any 
different burden - let alone an additional and unreasonable burden - on their submerged 
land. 
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Lastly, Appellees insist that under the Conatsers' theory, "every streambed in the 
state of Utah, regardless of its size and usefulness for floating, would be subject to a 
public easement for walking and wading." Opp. Brief at 28. This is not so. Any rights 
the public may have to make contact with a streambed must be incidental to a bona fide 
use of the public water itself See Gait, 731 P.2d 912, 915 ("The public has a right of use 
up to the high water mark, but only such use as is necessary to utilization of the water 
itself.") In other words, use of a streambed as a mere way of passage through private 
property would constitute a trespass under the approach urged by the Conatsers, since 
such walking or wading would not be incidental to a lawful use of the water. Only when 
the public is making use of the public water - such as by fishing, hunting, swimming, or 
floating - should the public enjoy the attendant right to make reasonably necessary 
contact with the underlying bed. If a stream or lake does not support public uses such as 
sport fishing, either because it is too small, too muddy, or too urban, there is no attendant 
public right to step on the bed in furtherance of those public uses. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Conatsers urge this Court to reverse that portion of 
the district court's ruling wherein the court concluded, as a matter of law, that touching of 
the streambed on Defendants' property is permissible only when it is incidental to 
navigating the Weber River in a watercraft, see Judgment, Record ("Rec") at 00310, and 
to declare that the Conatsers, as members of the general public, have the right to walk on 
the bed of the Weber River and wade in its waters while fishing therein. 
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Dated this 4th day of April, 2007. 
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